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facts, though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw
different conclusions from them. The summary judgment procedure
provided by Rule 56 is not a substitute for a trial by jury or a trial
by the court, but is a determination that as a matter of law there is
no genuine issue of material fact to be tried. The burden of showing
that there are no such factual issues rests upon the movant. See
Korn and Poley, Survey of Summary Judgment, Judgment on the
Pleadings and Related Pre-trial Procedures, 42 CORNELL L. REv.
483 (1957).
The plaintiffs contended that the trial court improperly considered their answers to the interrogatories upon defendant's motion for
summary judgment because Rule 56(c) does not expressly include
answers to interrogatories among the bases for awarding a summary
judgment. The court concluded, however, that the trial court was
warranted in considering the answers in the instant case particularly
inasmuch as the answers embodied statements of the parties to the
action. See Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 984 (1960). However, in light of
the fact that the jury could still have returned a verdict for the plaintiffs under the last clear chance doctrine, the question of negligence
should have been tried.

Courts-Declaratory Judgment-Abstention
Doctrine in Federal Equitable Relief
Plaintiffs, students of Marshall University, brought a class action seeking a declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality of certain
provisions of the Student Code promulgated and adopted by the
West Virginia Board of Regents for state colleges and universities,
and an injunction against its enforcement. The defendants (the Board
of Regents and certain officials at Marshall University) moved-before a three-judge federal district court to dismiss the action because
the challenged provisions of the Code had not been enforced against
any of the plaintiffs. Held, complaint dismissed. There was no allegation of harassment or threat of bad-faith enforcement of the Student
Code constituting irreparable harm to plaintiffs; consequently, there
was no basis for federal equitable relief or justiciable controversy
presented for declatory judgment. Woodruff v. West Virginia Board
of Regents, 328 F. Supp. 1023 (1971).
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The court's denial of relief was based primarily on Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Youngers interpretation of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The broad language of
Dombrowski indicated that a federal court could consider the constitutionality of a state statute or regulation and issue an injunction
against its enforcement if the statute was so overbroad that it had a
chilling effect on first amendment rights. Younger limited Dombrowski to cases in which irreparable injury could be shown, holding that
"the possible unconstitutionality of a statute 'on its face" does not in
itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it,
and that appellee [must show] bad faith, harassment, or any other
unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief." 401 U.S.
at 54. In Woodruff, no allegations of good or bad-faith enforcement
or circumstances constituting irreparable harm were made and the
court dismissed the case. The court acknowledged that the Younger
abstention standard is usually applied in the context of attack on
state criminal statutes, but held Woodruff indistinguishable for this
reason, noting that state interest in forestalling reasonably anticipated
campus violence created a stronger case for federal abstention. The
court also noted that the plaintiffs in Woodruff apparently had
searched the Student Code for provisions that could be used in the
future to inhibit first amendment rights. The court cited Boyle v.
Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), which held that this type of conduct
amounts to "nothing more than speculation about the future." 401
U.S. at 81.
Therefore, the court in Woodruff did not decide the constitutionality of the Student Code, but merely affirmed the Younger
criteria for invoking federal equitable jurisdiction.

Employer and Employee-Employer's Action for
Loss of Services of Employee
Plaintiff corporation alleged negligence on the part of defendants resulting in permanent injury to one of its employees, Claire
Lauria. Lauria, an executive employee, received severe injuries when
the auto in which she was a passenger collided with a tractor trailer
owned by defendants. Plaintiff contended such negligence deprived
it of services of the employee, and demanded a one million dollar
judgment for monetary losses. Defendants filed motions for judg-
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